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Abstract—In this work, we leverage hardware performance
counters-collected data to automatically group program fail-
ures that stem from closely related causes into clusters, which
can in turn help developers prioritize failures as well as
diagnose their causes. Hardware counters have been used
for performance analysis of software systems in the past. By
contrast, in this paper they are used as abstraction mechanisms
for program executions. The results of our feasibility studies
conducted on two widely-used applications suggest that hard-
ware counters-collected data can be used to reliably classify
failures.
Keywords-failure classification; debugging aids; hardware
performance counters.
I. INTRODUCTION
Many data-driven program analysis approaches have been
proposed in the literature. These approaches instrument the
source code and/or binaries of programs, collect execution
data from program runs every time the instrumentation
code is exercised, and analyze the collected data to help
shape future software development efforts. Some example
applications of this general approach include predicting
failures, detecting failures, and identifying likely causes of
failures [5], [9], [11], [13], [14], [16].
Another application, which is also the focus of this paper,
is concerned with automatically classifying failed program
executions. The classifications are often obtained by collect-
ing a specific type of execution data from failing runs, which
from now on is referred to as a program spectrum, and then
feeding this data to an unsupervised learning algorithm, such
as a cluster analysis algorithm. The result is a set of clusters
grouping similar failed executions together. Many empirical
studies suggest that individual clusters obtained from these
types of analyses tend to contain failures that stem from
closely related causes [6], [7], [8], [11]. Therefore, the
resulting clusters can help developers prioritize failures as
well as diagnose their causes.
A fundamental assumption behind these approaches is that
there are repeatable and identifiable patterns in failed pro-
gram executions and similarities to these patterns are highly
correlated with the causes of failures. Previous empirical
studies reported in the literature support this assumption [5],
[9], [11]. Consequently, one factor that affects the accuracy
of classifications is the type of program spectrum collected
to identify patterns in executions. In general, it is possible
to collect quite detailed information at runtime to identify
the patterns. However, the overhead cost both in terms of
the runtime overhead required to collect the spectra and
the space overhead required to store them often makes this
approach an impractical one. Therefore, it is still an open
question what to collect and how to analyze the collected
data to identify meaningful patterns in executions [16].
In this work a novel approach is proposed, in which most
of the data collection work is carried out by fast hardware
performance counters. Hardware performance counters are
CPU-resident counters that record various types of events
occurring on a CPU. They have been frequently used to
perform performance analysis of software systems in the
past (e.g., hot-spot analysis). By contrast, we leverage them
for a functionality-related purpose to classify failed program
executions.
The contributions of this paper can be summarized as
follows:
• A hardware performance counters-based program spec-
trum as an abstraction mechanism for program execu-
tions to classify failures is proposed.
• The proposed approach is empirically evaluated by
conducting experiments using two widely-used, real life
applications as our subject applications.
• The accuracy of our hardware counters-based spectra in
classifying failed executions to those of three different
types of program spectra are compared.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows:
Section II presents related work; Section III introduces the
proposed approach; Section IV describes the experiments
and analyzes the results obtained; and Section V draws some
concluding remarks.
II. RELATED WORK
Several researchers have studied various types of program
spectra to predict program execution behavior. Podgurski et
al. [6], [7], [11] present a set of techniques for clustering
program executions. Bowring et al. [2] introduce a tech-
nique based on Markov models to distinguish failed exe-
cutions from successful executions using branch coverage
information. Haran et al. [8] present several methods for
classifying execution data as belonging to one of several
classes. Brun and Ernst [3] identify dynamically discovered
likely program invariants to reason about program execution
behavior. Liblit et al. [10] use similar types of invariants for
fault localization. Agrawal et al. [1] and Jones et al. [9] use
statement coverage information to identify likely causes of
failures. Chen et al. [4] keep track of components exercised
during executions to pinpoint faulty components. Santelices
et al. [13] empirically evaluate the performance of several
types of program spectra in locating defects.
All of these approaches use program spectra collected
purely by software instrumentation. On the other hand, in
this work, substantial parts of the profiling task are pushed
onto the hardware by leveraging hardware performance
counters.
III. PROPOSED APPROACH
In this work, our aim is to automatically group similar
failed executions into clusters. We instrument programs,
collect hardware counters-based execution data at runtime,
and then analyze the collected data to identify the similarities
among executions.
Hardware performance counters are CPU-resident coun-
ters that record various events occurring on a CPU. Although
the types of events recognized by CPUs may vary across
platforms, today’s general-purpose CPUs are capable of
recording a wide variety of events, such as the number of
instructions executed, the number of branches taken, the
number of cache hits and misses experienced, etc. To activate
hardware performance counters, special-purpose assembly-
level instructions are used to pair a physical counter with an
event of interest and to instruct the CPU to start profiling.
After having activated hardware counters, the counter values
can be read and reset at runtime, and the counters can be
deactivated at will.
In this work use hardware performance counters-collected
data are used as abstraction mechanisms for program execu-
tions. We conjecture that counter values can capture patterns
occurring in executions and these patterns can then be used
to automatically classify similar failed executions.
A. Feasibility Study
To evaluate the plausibility of our hypothesis, we con-
ducted a simple feasibility study using the socket system
call as our subject.
The socket function creates an endpoint (i.e., socket)
for communication. We experimented with two input pa-
rameters of this function: domain and type. The domain
parameter specifies a communication domain (e.g., INET
and INET6), and the type parameter specifies the commu-
nication semantics (e.g., connection-based and connection-
less). These parameters take a value from a set of eleven and
six discrete settings, respectively. Furthermore, the socket
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Figure 1. The number of machine instructions executed in the socket
function.
function returns a file descriptor on success and an error
code on error. Note that this function is implemented at the
OS kernel level.
All combinations of the parameters settings are exhaus-
tively tested using 66 test cases. For each input combination,
the number of machine instructions executed during the
invocation of the socket function are measured. This was
performed by reading the value of the corresponding hard-
ware counter before and after calling the function and then
computing the difference. Since not all input combinations
were supported on our test platform, 51 of the test cases
failed with five unique error codes; 30 of them with error
#1, 11 with error #2, 7 with error #3, 2 with error #4, and
1 with error #5. Figure 1 visualizes the data obtained.
An initial question was: Can the total instruction counts
be used to automatically cluster the function calls that return
the same error code? To answer this question, we fed the
instruction counts to the Weka’s EM cluster analysis algo-
rithm [15]. This algorithm provided us with three clusters. It
was observed that each cluster was predominantly composed
of failures with error code #1, #2, or #3. The rest of the
failures with the error codes #4 and #5 was scattered among
the clusters.
As is the case with all spectrum-based approaches, our ap-
proach depends on having an adequate number of executions
to capture patterns and identify similarities. An inadequate
number of test cases, or, similarly, an uneven distribution
of failures across classes may degrade the accuracy of
clusters. This is because clustering techniques themselves
often perform poorly in such cases. in our feasibility study,
an instantiation of this phenomenon was observed. Since
there were only two failures with error #4 and only one
failure with error #5, the EM clustering algorithm was
not able to reliably cluster them. Since our goal is not to
evaluate clustering techniques themselves, we in this work
use failures as evenly distributed across classes as possible.
Figure 2. Clustering results after eliminating error #4 and #5
Then analysis are repeated without using the failures with
the error codes #4 and #5. Figure 2 visualizes the resulting
clusters. In this figure, the horizontal axis denotes the clus-
ters obtained, and the vertical axis depicts the percentages
of failures with the same error code in each cluster. As can
be seen from this figure, all the clusters obtained were pure.
That is, each cluster was composed only of failures with the
same error code.
An in-depth analysis of the implementation of the socket
function revealed that failed invocations that executed
around 2000 machine instructions did so because of a simple
check at the very top of the function that immediately returns
an error code if the parameters provided are not within the
supported range. Furthermore, the failed invocations that
executed more number of instructions did so because if an
error occurs after a certain point into the execution, the OS
kernel releases all the resources that have been allocated so
far. The farther into the execution an error occurs, the more
activities there are to be performed to release the resources.
For example, for the failed invocations that executed around
4000 instructions, only the kernel resources related to the
socket data structure were released, whereas, for the failed
invocations that executed more than 8000 instructions, more
resources were reclaimed on behalf of the kernel loadable
modules that implement the communication protocols. The
instruction counts data collected from hardware performance
counters was able to identify these patterns.
However,some cases where the failures with the same
error code were distributed among multiple clusters, were
observed. Automatic failure classifications obtained by using
data-driven analysis approaches, such as the one presented
here, are often not exact [11]. This is because correlations
may not always indicate causations. However, many em-
pirical studies strongly suggest that, despite the caveats,
such analysis results are of great practical importance to
practitioners [2], [5], [9], [10], [11], [16].
Although the results of this feasibility study are by no
means conclusive, it increased our beliefs that hardware
counters-collected data can be used to identify patterns in
Table I
AN EXAMPLE DATA TABLE
Test f1 f2 ... pass/fail
1 6660 3805 ... pass
2 -1 53445 ... fail
... ... ... ... ...
executions. More details about the proposed approach are
provided in the remainder of this section.
B. Program Spectra
In this work, executions at the level of function invo-
cations are profiled using a hardware performance counter
called, TOT INS. The TOT INS counter records the number
of machine instructions executed. To map the counter values
with function invocations, the value of the counter is read
before and after an invocation and attribute the difference to
the invocation.
Given a program and its test suite, all the test cases on the
program are executed and the program spectra are collected.
Table I depicts, as an example, a portion of program spectra
collected in a study for a subject application using the
TOT INS counter. Each row in this table represents a single
execution of the application with a test case. The first and the
last columns depict the test index and whether the test passed
or failed, respectively. Each remaining column corresponds
to a function and the values stored in the table depict the
total number of machine instructions executed in functions.
The counter values mapped to a function are aggregated
across all invocations of the function. For example, the first
row depicts a successful execution of test #1, in which there
were a total of 6660 and 3805 machine instructions executed
in functions f1 and f2, respectively. The value of -1 is used
in these tables to indicate the functions that were not invoked
in executions. These tables are referred as data tables in the
remainder of the paper.
C. Feature Selection and Cluster Analysis
The accuracy and performance of clustering techniques
often suffer as the dimension of the data being analyzed
increases. To alleviate this problem, a feature selection
algorithm is leveraged to select a small, but highly relevant
subset of functions. By following a similar approach pre-
sented in [11], this step is carried out by identifying those
functions that are most capable of reliably distinguishing
failed executions from successful executions.
For the feature selection step, a classifier subset evaluator
(CSE) algorithm [15] is used. This algorithm iteratively
evaluates potential function subsets, estimates the predictive
power of each subset using a classifier, and outputs the
best function subset that has been encountered. As the
classification algorithm to be used with the CSE algorithm
the J48 classification tree algorithm [15] is utilized. Once
Table II
SUBJECT APPLICATIONS USED IN THE EXPERIMENTS
subject number of number of total passing failing
application LOC functions defects tests tests tests
flex 10459 162 16 396 318 78
sed 14427 255 6 370 354 16
the set of highly relevant functions is identified, the rest of
the functions is ignored.
Then the remaining data is fed to a clustering algo-
rithm, called Expectation Maximization (EM) clustering
algorithm [15]. This algorithm is used, since, unlike many
other clustering algorithms, it does not require the number
of clusters to be known in advance. The EM algorithm is
a probabilistic algorithm working in two alternating steps;
expectation and maximization. In the expectation step, the
probabilities of cluster memberships are computed. In the
maximization step, the overall likelihood of the data (given
the clusters) is maximized by reconfiguring the clusters.
The algorithm stops when the difference between successive
iterations is smaller than a threshold value. The output is a
set of clusters grouping similar failed executions together.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
We conducted an initial set of feasibility studies to eval-
uate the accuracy of our proposed approach in classifying
failures.
A. Subject Applications
In these experiments two open source applications
are used as our subject applications: flex and sed.
These applications are widely-used utility applications on
UNIX/Linux platforms. The flex application generates lex-
ical analyzers, and the sed application filters and transforms
text as a stream editor
Our subject applications were taken from an indepen-
dent defect repository, called Software-artifact Infrastructure
Repository (SIR) (sir.unl.edu). Each subject application had
its own test suite and test oracles, which were utilized in
our experiments. Table II provides some statistics about the
subject applications used in the experiments.
B. Experimental Setup
The SIR repository also provided us with a set of known
defects for our subject applications. Each defect was identi-
fied with a unique defect identifier, and the defects were able
to be activated individually as needed. The flex and sed
applications used in the experiments had 16 and 6 known
defects, respectively.
First all the defects are activated in our subject applica-
tions and their test suites are executed . Then it is determined
whether the tests were successful or not with the help of the
test oracles that came with the test suites.
To collect the program spectra from these executions, the
Scalasca tool (www.scalasca.org) is used. This tool provided
us with dynamic call trees observed in executions. Each
function invocation in these trees was annotated with the
number of machine instructions executed in it. These call
trees are parsed and a data table is created for each subject
application, such as the one presented in Table I.
Once the data tables were ready, first the feature selec-
tion step is performed.Then all the successful executions
are excluded from our data tables and only the functions
chosen in the feature selection step are kept. Finally, the
failed executions are automatically clustered as explained
in Section III-C. These steps were carried out by using
the Weka data mining tool [15]. All the experiments were
performed on a Pentium D machine with 1GB of RAM,
running the CentOS 5.2 operating system.
C. Comparative Studies
In our experiments, the accuracy of our hardware
counters-based spectrum is compared (TOT INS) to that of
three different types of spectra, namely CALL SWT, TIME,
and VISIT.
The CALL SWT spectrum records the functions invoked
during executions. Each execution record in the CALL SWT
spectrum reflects whether a function is invoked (indicated
by 1) or not (indicated by -1) during the execution. Note
that our hardware counters-based TOT INS spectrum also
leverages function coverage information, in addition to the
instruction counts. By comparing the TOT INS spectrum to
the CALL SWT spectrum, we aim to single out the effect
of using instruction counts in clustering failures from the
effect of using function coverage information. Since the only
difference between the TOT INS and CALL SWT spectra
is the presence of instruction counts, differences between the
performance of these spectrum types can safely be attributed
to using instruction counts.
The TIME spectrum is the trace of function execution
times measured at the level of nanoseconds in terms of
the CPU allocation times. In an earlier study [16], time
spectra was used to locate defects. Empirical evaluations
suggested that execution times can be used to capture pat-
terns in program executions. However, one downside of this
approach was the inaccuracies and imprecisions associated
with measuring execution times. In this work, we conjecture
that, being a related, but more precise and accurate spectrum,
the TOT INS spectrum is capable of clustering failures
better than the TIME spectrum.
Table III
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
sut TOT INS VISIT CALL SWT TIME
class1 class2 class3 class1 class2 class3 class1 class2 class3 class1 class2 class3
flex
cluster1 0 100 0 100 0 0 0 50 50 54,5 0 45,5
cluster2 12,5 0 87,5 0 0 100 100 0 0 56 0 44
cluster3 0 0 100 100 0 0 - - - 0 83,8 16,2
cluster4 100 0 0 0 100 0 - - - - - -
cluster5 100 0 0 100 0 0 - - - - - -
cluster6 0 0 100 0 0 100 - - - - - -
RI 0.87 0.89 0.78 0.74
sed
cluster1 0 100 - 50 50 - 50 50 - 50 50 -
cluster2 0 100 - - - - - - - - - -
cluster3 100 0 - - - - - - - - - -
RI 0.87 0.47 0.47 0.47
The VISIT spectrum, on the other hand, records the
number of times each function is invoked during executions.
Podgurski et al. [11] use this spectrum type to classify
failures. In our experiments, it is observed that the TOT INS
and VISIT spectra are highly correlated. An analysis of the
data collected in our experiments revealed that the total num-
ber of machine instructions executed in a function during an
execution is correlated with the number of times the function
is called with a correlation coefficient of 0.98 on average.
Although the data values are correlated, we hypothesize that
the TOT INS spectrum convey more information for reliably
classifying failures.
D. Evaluation Framework
To be able to evaluate the quality of the resulting clusters,
we required to pinpoint the causes of failures so that we
could quantify to which extent the clusters contain failures
caused by the same defect. Since each subject application
used in our experiments had several defects, this posed an
issue for us. The information about which subset of all
activated defects was responsible for the manifestation of
a given failure was not known to us.
In this work the delta debugging algorithm [17] is lever-
aged to identify failure inducing defects. In our implementa-
tion of this algorithm, each atomic change (a concept defined
in delta debugging) corresponds to the activation of a single
defect. At a very high level, this algorithm explores the
subsets of all the defects in an iterative fashion until it finds
a ”minimal” set of defects that, once activated, causes the
program to produce the same faulty output as is produced
when all the defects are activated. The output is a subset of
all the defects such that deactivating a single defect in this
subset would make the program produce a different output.
The failure inducing defects for each failed execution
are identified in our experiments using the delta debugging
algorithm. Then the failures that are caused by the same
set of defects are grouped into classes. Finally these classes
are used to evaluate the accuracy of automatically identified
clusters by leveraging a well-known information retrieval-
based metric, called rand index [12].
Rand index (RI) is computed as follows;
RI =
TP + TN
TP + FP + FN + TN
A true positive (TP) decision assigns two similar failures
(i.e., failures with the same class) to the same cluster, a
true negative (TN) decision assigns two dissimilar failures
(i.e., failures with different classes) to different clusters,
whereas a false positive (FP) decision assigns two dissimilar
failures to the same cluster, and a false negative decision
(FN) assigns two similar failures to different clusters. In
effect, RI measures the ratio of decisions that are correct. It
takes a value between 0 and 1. The higher the value of RI,
the better the clustering is.
E. Data & Analysis
The delta debugging algorithm identified three classes of
failures for the flex application, and two classes of failures
for the sed application. The number of clusters obtained for
the various types of program spectra used in the experiments
varied. Table III summarizes the results of our experiments.
In this table, columns indicate the classes of failures, and
rows depict the clusters. The cell values are the percent-
ages of failure classes included in automatically identified
clusters. For example, cluster1 obtained by using the
TIME spectrum on the flex application is composed of
54, 5% class1 and 45.5% class3 failures. Furthermore,
class1 failures are distributed across two clusters, namely
cluster1 and cluster2. The dash characters indicate
data not applicable. The RI values are provided for each pair
of subject application and spectrum type.
Comparing the TOT INS spectrum to the CALL SWT
spectrum revealed that using total instruction counts pro-
vided by hardware performance counters improved the ac-
curacy of clustering by about 38% on average over not using
them. The average RI value was 0.87 for the TOT INS
spectrum and 0.63 for the CALL SWT spectrum.
Comparing the TOT INS spectrum to the TIME spectrum
exposed that, being a more precise spectrum compared to
the time spectrum, our hardware counters-based spectrum
improved the accuracy by 43% on average. The average
RI values were 0.87 and 0.61 for the TOT INS and TIME
spectrum, respectively.
Then the accuracy of the clusters obtained from TOT INS
spectrum is compared to those obtained from VISIT spec-
trum. It was observed that TOT INS spectrum increased
the accuracy by 28% on average. The average RI values
were 0.87 and 0.68 for the TOT INS and VISIT spectrum,
respectively. Although, as discussed in Section IV-C, the
TOT INS spectrum was highly correlated with the VISIT
spectrum, visual investigation of the data and the resulting
clusters revealed that instruction counts via summarizing
computational activities occurring in function invocations
provided more information compared to using invocation
frequencies only. As our results indicate, the additional
information was helpful in improving the accuracy.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this work we leveraged a hardware performance
counters-based program spectrum to automatically group
failures that stem from closely related causes into clusters.
Hardware counters have been used for performance analysis
of software systems in the past. By contrast, we in this work
use them as abstraction mechanisms for program executions.
We conducted a feasibility study to evaluate the proposed
approach. In this study we used two widely-used applica-
tions as our subject applications and compared the accuracy
of hardware counters-based spectra to those of three different
types of program spectra.
All empirical studies suffer from threats to their inter-
nal and external validity. For this work, we are primarily
concerned with threats to external validity since they limit
our ability to generalize our results. One threat concerns
the representativeness of the subject applications used in
the experiments. Although they are all real-life applications,
they only represent two data points. A related threat concerns
the representativeness of the defects used in the experiments.
Although our subject applications were taken from an inde-
pendent defect repository which has been leveraged by many
related studies in the literature, they only represent a subset
of defects.
Keeping these limitations in mind, we believe that our
results, although preliminary, supports our basic hypothesis:
Hardware performance counters-collected data can be used
to classify program failures.
Many software quality assurance approaches, such as fault
localization, failure prediction, software security assurance,
and in-the-field quality assurance, depend on finding patterns
in program executions and identifying similarities to these
patterns and/or deviations from them. Our ultimate goal
beyond the scope of this work is to provide reliable means of
capturing patterns in executions as unobtrusively as possible.
Our motivation behind leveraging hardware performance
counters for this purpose is a simple one: Hardware is
one of the best places to profile executions with as little
runtime overhead as possible. We, therefore, are continuing
to investigate how hardware counters-collected data can
serve as abstraction mechanisms for program executions in
various software quality assurance approaches.
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